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THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
ATTEMPTS TO LEGISLATE TASTE IN MORAL AND 
POLITICAL BELIEFS* 
Samuel D. Estepf 
IN a nutshell, the topic of this paper is "Comstockery and the Bowdlerizing of Ideas." The thesis here asserted is that the 
Rule of Law is violated when legislatures succumb to modern at-
tempts by the often pathologically-motivated zealot legally to 
freeze current tastes in moral and political beliefs. The relation-
ship between taste statutes and the seemingly esoteric topic, "The 
Legislative Process and the Rule of Law," is based on the premise 
that the maximum possible degree of intellectual freedom for each 
individual is an essential ingredient in the legal system of a civilized 
society. 
Archibald MacLeish, although addressing himself to a some-
what different topic, has beautifully stated this concept of in-
dividual intellectual freedom which should be considered a part 
of the Rule of Law.1 In speaking of the national purpose which 
is the basic foundation of the Declaration of Independence and of 
the United States Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, he 
said that "prior to July 4th, 1776, the national purpose of nations 
had been to dominate: to dominate at least their neighbors and 
rivals and, wherever possible, to dominate the world. The Ameri-
can national purpose was the opposite: to liberate from domina-
tion; to set men free." He goes on to say that this is what is some-
times referred to as "the American Dream. We were dedicated 
from our beginnings to the proposition that we existed not merely 
to exist but also to be free, and the dedication was real in spite of 
the fact that it took us three generations and a bloody war to prac-
tice our preachment within our 01rn frontiers. It was real in spite 
of the fact that its practice is still a delusion in numerous pockets 
of hypocrisy across the nation." He continues, "And America did 
move steadily on before it lost headway in the generation in which 
we live. The extraordinary feel of liveness that the Americans 
communicated, whether agreeably or not, to their early European 
• Lecture delivered on June 28, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general 
topic, "Post-War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special 
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 
June 20 - July 1, 1960. -Ed. 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1 MacLeish, National Purpose: MacLeish "Dream,'' N.Y. Times, May 30, 1960, p. 14, 
col. I. 
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visitors came from that sense of national expectation. We were 
never a very philosophical people politically after Jefferson and 
his contemporaries left us. We were practical men who took in-
struction from the things we saw and heard and did. But the pur-
pose defined in our Declaration was a reality to us notwithstand-
ing. It gave us aim as the Continent gave us scope, and the old 
American character with its almost anarchic passion for idosyncrasy 
and difference was the child of both." He then makes a statement 
which is peculiarly appropriate in considering the type of statute 
here discussed. He says, "The truth is, of course, that freedom is 
never an accomplished fact. It is always a process. Which is why 
the drafters of the Declaration spoke of the pursuit of happiness: 
They knew their Thucydides and therefore knew that 'the secret of 
happiness is freedom and the secret of freedom, courage.' The 
only way freedom can be defended is not by fencing it in but by 
enlarging it~ exercising it." [Emphasis added.] 
Actually matters of taste in moral and political beliefs cannot 
be handled adequately by legislative action. Statutory enactments 
not only tend to mislead society into thinking that the problem is 
solved, but they also indicate that a society has lost faith in itself. 
They paint, for the world to see, a picture not of intellectual free-
dom and enthusiasm for the morrow, but of an intellectual de-
cadence which others care not to copy. The value judgments 
underlying these statutes are open to serious question and we must 
not let ourselves be stampeded or panicked into thinking we can 
legislate taste in the expression of beliefs, moral or political. These 
are taught by example, and history tells us that they change. We 
must be willing to hear new ideas, and to condone the actions of 
those we find objectionable only as a matter of taste. The Com-
stocks of today must not be allowed to emasculate our intellectual 
vigor merely because thoughts are couched in terms found dis-
tasteful to some or even to a temporary majority. A legislative 
Rule of Law should be that the mind (although not necessarily 
all the actions) of man should be free! 
When seen in proper historical perspective, the folly or at least 
futility of enacting such taste statutes becomes obvious. The 
thesis here propounded, however, is that the kinds of modern 
statutes criticized in this discussion are not only as futile as some 
of the humorous historical examples to be described, but, more 
importantly, also run counter to the concept of individual intel-
lectual freedom, which is-or ought to be-part of our Rule of Law. 
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Before describing the old, however, and then cataloging the 
new taste statutes whose enactment the legal profession should op-
pose, several matters of definition and caution must be mentioned, 
including a definition of the Rule of Law. 
I. DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW 
Most of the writing resulting from the recent resurgence of 
interest in the Rule of Law, to the extent that a definition in gen-
eral terms is attempted, seems to be rather sterile mental gym-
nastics. At best, the Mad Hatter's suggestion to Alice is appro-
priate-the Rule of Law seems to mean what each individual using 
the term wants it to mean. For present purposes it is defined as 
follows: A search for the Rule of Law is man's attempt to deter-
mine with some degree of rationality the basic value judgments 
which should determine the actions and attitudes he will legally 
enforce or prohibit, encourage or discourage. Meaningful ex-
ploration of the topic for almost all persons starts and ends with 
attempts to identify the specific values which the law should foster. 
Quixotic tilting at generalities is tempting but almost never re-
warding. 
Even the source from which these basic values are derived is 
not our concern. Many, including the writer, think they come 
from the minds of men, including not only his ability to think but 
also to feel. Even those who assert that there is a divinely-inspired, 
or perhaps a divinely-determined set of rules, must admit that these 
rules are communicated to the rest of us through the tongue and 
pen of man, and the possibility of error in the transcription is 
obvious. The search for the immutable, everlasting verities must 
continue. But the searcher should be most reluctant to assume 
that he or anyone else at any one time has discovered what such 
verities are, or at least how they should be applied to individual 
situations at any specific period in history. Each legislative en-
actment's desirability should be tested against the best thinking at 
the time as to what the basic values of our society are. It is here 
suggested that taste statutes constitute an encroachment upon the 
basic value of individual intellectual freedom, and that lawyers 
should therefore try to convince legislators that society loses more 
than it gains by such enactments. These losses include not only 
the loss of intellectual freedom, but a potentially greater loss in 
that the statutes strain the limits of the legal system as an effective 
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tool of social control and thus tend to weaken the system in the 
area where it must operate to maintain order. 
Most of the types of legislation to be discussed have been 
treated separately in legal periodicals, but typically with emphasis 
only on constitutional limitations on governmental actions. In 
many of these cases a constitutional question of some significance 
is involved, but here our interest is much broader. In considering 
the Rule of Law and its meaning for our legal system, there should 
be an affirmative character to such analysis far beyond the negative 
prohibition found in most of our constitutional concepts limiting 
the power of the government to control the individual in society. 
All citizens, and particularly the members of the legal profession, 
have a responsibility to see that the legislature concerns itself with 
things vital to our society and which can appropriately be dealt 
with by statute. The legislature should not be permitted to be-
come so absorbed in prohibiting that its enactments are unimagina-
tive and ineffective in dealing with important problems. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE BAR 
Lawyers as a group have given too little attention to the legisla-
tive process which today is the most vital part of our legal system 
of social controls.2 We have concentrated on the legal rules im-
posed by the courts in the traditional common law areas or in their 
role as interpreters of statutes, and, in the last two decades or so, on 
those enforced by the administrative agencies and the executive 
branch of government. Except as an individual lawyer has a 
client whose interests are involved in a particular piece of legisla-
tion, seldom is the organized bar actively engaged in scrutinizing, 
and where necessary, criticizing, the statutes which the legislature 
is adopting at a particular time. 
It is true that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the 
American Law Institute, and various groups in the American Bar 
Association and state bar organizations work on statutory revision. 
Most of such efforts, however, are directed to "technical" matters 
dealing with property law, contracts, and court procedures. These 
are important areas, of course, and la-wyers should give even more 
attention to them. On the other hand, the bar probably is the only 
organized group which, over a period of centuries, will see that the 
value judgments being made by the legislature are consistent with 
2 See comments by Frank Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State Legis-
latures, COLUlliBIA LAw SCHOOL CENTENNIAL CoNFERENCE VOLUME, p. 69 (1959). 
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our fundamental concepts of achieving progress and at the same 
time protecting individual rights to freedom of beliefs. One in-
dividual, no matter how brave, can do little to check the excesses 
of the legislatures. Only to the extent that we have safety in num-
bers, and can point to our long history of concern for civil liberties 
(too often inadequately acted upon it is true), will we be able to pre-
serve the principles upon which our system is built. To find and 
support these values in essence is a search for a Rule of Law. 
The ideas discussed here are not the only important or even 
the most important aspects of a legislative Rule of Law. Never-
theless, a unifying thread of a social value judgment is involved in 
all of these apparently unrelated statutes, and lawyers should rec-
ognize that the Rule of Law is being abused by such enactments, 
whether or not constitutional principles are violated. We should 
diligently oppose legislation dealing with subjects such as are here 
discussed, although it possibly subjects us to public criticism on 
the ground we are fostering irreligion, immorality, and subversion. 
III. A CAUTION ABOUT EMOTIONS 
One caution about emotions is necessary. Probably each per-
son, including the ·writer, at some point, will feel uncomfortable 
because these subjects stir one's emotions. In the writer's opinion, 
however, those things about which we have emotional reactions 
must be recognized and we must realize that although having the 
reaction is perfectly normal it is not rational to pass laws as the 
result solely of these emotional responses. A case can be made that 
the zealots who push too hard for the type of legislation discussed 
here are fairly described as sick, at least to the extent of suffering 
from what psychiatrists term "reaction formation." They prob-
ably are trying to fortify their own weak wills. This is not to sug-
gest that all legislators who adopt such statutes, or those lawyers 
hired to draft such material, are themselves sick. Our society, and 
particularly the legislature, is misguided and irrational, however, 
when it gives in to the incantations of such zealots whose over-
reaction to the evils they see or imagine in society is at least im-
mature. Although often emotionally sympathetic with the motiva-
tion of such zealots, Ia-wyers must concern themselves with the 
question of what types of legislation should be enacted and as 
members of the bar we ought to protest those which we think are 
inconsistent with the more basic value judgments we believe to be 
important in establishing the legal rules by which we live. 
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IV. SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, FREQUENTLY HUMOROUS 
A history of legislation dealing with taste in moral and politi-
cal beliefs could begin at almost any point in recorded history but 
possibly most significant for Americans is what happened in Eng-
land. During the reign of Edward III in the 14th century the 
English Parliament enacted two sumptuary laws directed against 
sumptuous living. One regulated the number of courses an Eng-
lishman could serve for dinner,3 possibly to create a larger source 
of funds which the King could tap for his own purposes, including 
the conduct of wars. The second Edwardian taste statute dealt 
with apparel.4 It provided that none but the high (and they were 
also the mighty) should be so ostentatious and extravagant as to 
wear fur. A quarter of a century later handball, football, cock 
fighting and other games were outlawed.11 
In spite of the efforts of officials of the King and the Church, 
enforcement of these types of prohibitions was not effective and 
Parliament repealed all apparel statutes in 1604 and rejected re-
enactment attempts in 1656, perhaps in part as a result of criti-
cisms such as those expressed by John Milton in A reopagitica. 6 
A new type of taste statute prohibiting blasphemy began to 
appear during the 17th century in England. Directed first at use 
of blasphemy in plays and shows,7 the prohibition against "pro-
3 BALDWIN, SUMPTUARY LEGISLATION AND PERSONAL REGULATION IN ENGLAND 24 (1926). 
4 It provided that no man or woman in England, Ireland, '\Vales, or Scotland - the 
King, Queen, and their children and certain nobles and churchmen only excepted, should 
wear any fur in or on his clothes upon penalty of the forfeiture of the fur, and further to 
be punished "by the King's will." BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 30-32. Although such 
an enactment today would find some sympathy among husbands and animal lovers, in 
the light of women's suffrage it would surely be politically unfeasible. In any event the 
feminine glee probably is worth the pain it costs and in case of doubt the presumption 
should be in favor of freedom. 
6 Edward III forbade "handball, football, handy ball ..• or cockfighting" and en-
couraged archery (so vital to the defense of England) by requiring regular contests in the 
use of the bow. BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 57. '\\Tould it not have been much 
better in the long run to avoid the unenforceable negative and concentrate on the affirma-
tive requirement? 
6 Id. at 249 and 264. 
7 The law was directed to "the preventing and avoiding of the great abuse of the 
holy name of God in stage plays, interludes, May games, shews and such like," so that 
thereafter anyone acting in a play, pageant, or similar activity must not, "jestingly or 
profanely speak or use the name of God, Jesus, Christ, the Holy Ghost or the Trinity," 
and if he should do so he "should forfeit ten pounds for every offense, one-half to go to 
the king, the other half to anyone who should sue in any court of record at Westminster." 
Id. at 268. (Emphasis added.) As Bristol put it, "how the graceless king •.. could say 
'Le Roi le veut' to it whilst he himself was swearing obscenely passes comprehension." 
Ibid. 
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fane swearing and cursing" was broadened in 1650.8 These stat-
utes made use of informer's fees and graduated penalty provisions.9 
The prevalence of tippling and drunkenness, even among the 
clergymen,10 during this same period brought about a statute 
which provided that only travelers, and artisans and laborers dur-
ing their dinner hours only, were permitted to drink in inns and 
alehouses. 
James, like Edward III, also undertook to regulate the playing 
of games and other amusements, but not without making certain 
exceptions which were objectionable to the Puritans.U The 
Puritans gained revenge during the Puritan Revolution, however, 
and the Declaration of Sports of James I was burned and the books 
were destroyed as well as all copies of the Declaration.12 Neverthe-
less, in general, by this time most of the original sumptuary legisla-
tion had ceased to have much, if any, effect. 
The responsibility for these sumptuary laws can not be placed 
on the Puritans or even on Christianity generally. Historians have 
found austerity statutes enjoining the spartan life in early Greek 
groups, particularly the Dorian races. In Laconia no drinking was 
allowed at entertainments and no furniture was tolerated which 
was more elaborate than could be made with axe and saw.13 The 
Romans, as early as 215 B.C., prohibited women from possessing 
more than ½ ounce of gold, or wearing a dress of different colors.14 
Later the Romans went even further. In 187 B.C., laws controlled 
the number of guests who could be entertained at one time, and in 
161 B.C. it became illegal to serve fowl when entertaining, except 
Bld. at 269. 
9 lbid. A duke, marquis, earl, viscount, or baron was fined thirty shillings; a baronet 
or knight, tlventy shillings; an esquire, ten shillings; a gentleman, six shillings, eight 
penny; and all inferior persons, three shillings, four penny. It was a graduated fine in 
another sense also, in that the fines were doubled from the second offense to the ninth. 
The penalty was also imposed on women, if they used oaths. A wife or widow paid 
according to the rank of her husband, while a single woman paid according to the rank 
of her father. If the offender were a child under twelve years of age he was put in the 
stocks or publicly whipped in lieu of the fine. If an anti-swearing law were enforced 
rigorously today our armed forces would be reduced drastically and food would be taken 
from the mouths of babes of great groups of our work force who swear frequently and with 
abandon. 
10 Id. at 273. 
11 ld. at 272. 
12 ld. at 273. 
13 21 ENcvc. BRIT. 559 (14th ed. 1937). Perhaps encouragement of a spartan existence 
was essential for survival and justified such enactments but these regulations soon became 
only taste statutes. 
14lbid. 
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one hen, unfattened.16 Apparently these statutes were not attempts 
merely to make good soldiers or save food. 
The English were not the only people to adopt Greek and 
Roman taste statutes. Such statutes were very common and ex-
tremely extensive in coverage of subjects throughout Europe dur-
ing the middle ages and later. Niirnberg legally regulated ex-
travagance of dress, particularly of "children during Holy Week,"10 
and prohibited "peaks on the shoes."17 A maximum of six men 
and six women guests at weddings was imposed by law,18 and the 
giving of wedding gifts was severely limited.19 Those who in-
formed on violators were protected by law against any opprobrium! 
Later in Niirnberg ladies were prohibited from serenading on the 
streets as part of the wedding festivities because such activities did 
not "become a maiden and matronly modesty."20 A related regu-
lation might appeal to parents of teenagers today. It prohibited 
"any but the customary dances which have come do·wn from old," 
and the dancers even then were legally prohibited from taking 
"by the neck or embracing one another."21 
One N iirnberg regulation, of all things, deals with men's 
clothes.22 The gradual shortening of men's outer garments, which 
at first had reached the ground, outraged the sense of propriety 
of those in power. The Council tried to stop the length of these 
jackets at the point as far down as the arms extended but they were 
not able to stem the tide of fashion. The one thing insisted on by 
15 Ibid. Today one might seek to legislate against being overweight which insurance 
companies say means over 145-160 pounds for a male of average height and frame. N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 2, 1960, p. 25, col. 4. Surely such legislative interference today would be 
unacceptable. The Marine Corps, however, is trying to achieve it by fiat. Id., Nov. 14, 
1960, p. I, col. 3. 
16 GREENFIED, SU!',IPTUARY I.Aw IN NURNBERG 30 (1918). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Id. at 34. If thirteen or more were present each was liable to a fine of ten pounds 
haller, and so was the host. Ibid. Perhaps the city fathers wanted only to stop week-long 
celebrations which meant the loss of productive capacity of all participants, but surely a 
time limitation would have served this purpose better. 
19 Id. at 41. To help in the enforcement of such provisions, the person who expected 
to have a wedding in his house was required to go to the rathaus and read the laws as 
written and then give his word that he and his wife would observe them. 
20Id. at 63. 
21 Id. at 93-94. The 15th-century rule reads as follows: "Since it has definitely come 
to the knowledge of the honorable council that many unwonted shameful immodest and 
novel dances are daily encouraged and practiced, which is not only a sin and without 
doubt displeasing to Almighty God, but also may produce much dishonorable light-mind-
edness and scandal besides, among men and women, the same to prevent, our lords of the 
council earnestly and strictly command, that henceforth no player or minstrel shall pipe, 
play or cause any but the customary dances which have come down from old; also no one 
whoever it be, woman or man, shall dance the same, and in dancing shall not take by 
the neck or embrace one another. (Emphasis added.) 
22 Id. at 114-115. 
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the Council, however, was that the mantle should cover the fly of 
men's trousers. The reason is found in the then-current fashion 
to make flies of a conspicuous color contrasting with that of the 
breeches, and to have the flap "stuffed and artifically enlarged." 
This reaction to men's shortening jackets sounds very much like 
the plaints heard today about women's necklines, only in the re-
verse direction. In considering how nebulous and changing are 
tastes in clothes, it is worth noting that perhaps women have been 
unjustly accused by men of originating such anatomical deceptions. 
Sumptuary laws were common also in the great cities of 
Switzerland during the Middle Ages. Invariably profanity was 
regulated, and in 1520 three men were executed under ordinances 
enacted during the Protestant Reformation.23 Equally prevalent 
were Sunday laws which nevertheless made exceptions for practice 
by rifleshooters and users of the cross bow.24 Zurich later pro-
hibited the giving of gloves to women who took part in christening 
ceremonies25 and Basel tried to shorten funeral exercises by limit-
ing the number of mourners and enjoining shorter funeral ser-
mons, "especially in time of epidemic."26 
Many regulations of dress are found throughout Europe during 
this period. Zurich once decreed that women of a certain class 
might have silk borders on their bodices but without hooks or 
buckles.27 The penalty for breach of this ordinance was con-
fiscation or sale "for the benefit of the husband's business neces-
sities." The incongruities of human taste are demonstrated by 
the fact that the limitation on belts was not applicable to those who 
belonged to the "aristocratic gilds" and to "public prostitutes." In 
France, Philip IV regulated both the table and dress of his people, 
and Charles V forbade long-pointed shoes.28 
Historical studies of the medieval period in Europe clearly 
23 VINCENT, CosruME AND CONDUcr 12 (1935). 
!M Id. at 17. One provided that on Sundays "no one may walk up and down on St. 
Peter's Platz, go into secret places to play cards, or commit other wanton acts." The 
exceptions indicate that the city fathers were sensitive to strong enough pressures. The 
riflcshooters were to practice without noise or confusion and could not admit to their 
quarters persons who came just for the eating and drinking. It surely is a safe guess that 
a number of poor shooters joined. 
2r; Id. at 23. 
26 Id. at 27. 
27 Id. at 44-45. The provision for sale for the benefit of the husband's creditors is 
not completely unfamiliar to those familiar with common law doctrines regarding gifts 
and fraud on creditors. 
28 21 ENcYc. BRIT. 559 (14th ed. 1937). Chiropodists assert that such a ban today 
would do much to lessen the discomfort and improve the disposition of people, but the 
suffrage guaranteed by the 19th amendment surely precludes such interference with 
women's sufferance[ 
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show that these "sumptuary laws were not the expression of sec-
taries or radicals or of men in an eddy, but of representative public 
minds."29 These early attempts of society to regulate, usually by 
means of criminal statutes, what could be termed taste in moral 
and religious beliefs gives the necessary historical perspective to 
evaluate the place of taste legislation in modern society. Although 
the examples given may seem humorous they were chosen to em-
phasize how obviously inappropriate was the subject matter for 
legal regulation. And such regulation is not representative of only 
the dark or Middle Ages. As late as 1959, the Germans completed 
a revision of some 15,000 laws dating back to 1795, of which only 
400 survived the revision.30 These old laws included fines for 
smoking, two years imprisonment for encouraging fellow citizens 
to leave the country, and one, which put a reverse twist on the older 
sumptuary laws, required the well-to-do, on pain of criminal 
punishment, to use wool and linen in burying the dead. Of the 
400 retained in the modern enactments most regulate matters 
of property, roads, and water rights. 
V. MODERN TASTE STATUTES 
Surely history teaches us that the next half millennium will 
produce the same drastic change in custom and manners so that 
modern taste statutes, now thought sensible by the temporary 
majority, will be considered silly 500 years from now. Attempts 
to freeze such tastes in statutes are not merely silly, however, they 
are dangerous. Some will feel that at least a few of the laws here 
discussed are improperly placed in the category of objectionable 
statutes and a few may even be disturbed by the categorization. 
Emotional anxiety or anger, however, is a signal to pause and think, 
not a proper basis for concluding that a first and emotional reac-
tion is a rational basis upon which a legislative judgment should 
be made as to what values should be legally imposed through the 
legislative process. 
Because this discussion is concerned with the trend of legisla-
tive thinking as a product of the times, reference is made not to 
the statute books as such, or directly to the many cases decided 
daily by the courts in this country. Rather, two other sources 
were chosen: The New York Times from January to June 1960, 
and the Legislative Research Checklists for 1959 and 60, published 
by the Council of State Governments. These sources seem more 
29 GREENFIELD, SUMPTUARY LAW IN NURNBERG 31 (1918). 
so N.Y. Times, June 19, 1960, p. 20, col. I. 
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likely to reflect a trend of current thinking which finds its way 
into statutory rules with no or little direct assistance from the bar 
or the bench, except as members at large of the community. These 
sources obviously are not slanted to emphasize the startling, the 
lurid, or the ridiculous. Nevertheless, an interesting and disturb-
ing story can be constructed from their staid contents. 
A. Religious Laws 
One type of statute which is most ill-advised and which the 
organized bar should oppose, is that dictating that Sunday shall 
be a legal day of rest. For example, in June 1960,31 the Attorney 
General of Maryland was asked to give an interpretation of the 
Maryland statute prohibiting the making of "loud and unseemly 
noises" and the doing of "bodily labor" on Sunday. His opinion 
was asked as to the right to use power lawnmowers in Baltimore. 
His very practical opinion indicated that they could be used on 
Sunday-if they were quiet and if they did not require too much 
effort to push. While he concocted a most practical opinion it 
seems ludicrous that he was put in such a position. Perhaps the 
moral of his ruling is: keep your machine well oiled. 
Nor does one have to look far in the press to find instance after 
instance of the agitation for the type of law Massachusetts recently 
adopted banning sales on Sunday,32 and which the Westchester 
County (New York) realty board wants to enact33 to prevent "un-
fair" competition from salesmen who work on Sundays. These 
laws sometimes are justified on the grounds that everybody needs 
a day of rest and it is convenient to pick Sunday because this is the 
day on which most do take a day off. If this were really carried 
to its logical extreme, why not legally adopt a five-day working 
week as New Zealand has done?34 There the law prevents the 
opening other than on Monday through Friday, of any kind of 
establishment with certain very minor exceptions for emergency 
purposes and one small concession to the gastronomical needs of 
man allowing small dairies selling milk, ice cream and similar com-
modities to remain open. 
We may be less than honest when we argue that a day of rest 
is our concern if by that is meant a day of physical rest for purposes 
of health. Our history makes it clear that these laws are a modem 
31 Ann Arbor News, June 14, 1960, p. 14, col. 1. 
32 N.Y. Times, June 12, 1960, p. 66, col. 5. 
33 Id., April 23, 1960, p. 25, col. 8. 
84 Id., June 24, 1960, p. 30, col. 3. 
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version of the old laws of the Middle Ages clearly enacted for 
religious purposes. They found their way into the colonial laws of 
this country and then into the laws of the states of this nation at 
the insistence of Christians and their leaders. The Supreme Court 
of the United States in its 1960 term agreed to hear a case from 
Massachusetts, one from Pennsylvania, and one from Maryland 
testing whether or not these so-called Sunday laws are constitu-
tional.35 Regardless of whether or not they are constitutional 
(and they are not if the Court is willing to recognize the real 
motivation for such enactments) they are statutes which, as a 
matter of legislative policy, should not be enacted. Such statutes 
discriminate against important minorities within our own society, 
whether they be of the Jewish religion, believers in the principles 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist, or followers of the Moslem, the 
Buddhist, or any other group. The attitude exemplified by this 
type of statute is typical and is to be expected of many members of 
the Christian church whether they be Catholic or Protestant. 
Actually, however, such legal discrimination seems inconsistent 
with true Christian principles, if Christ's peaceful moral persuasion 
approach is accepted. That such laws create a substantial volume 
of legal work is illustrated by a recent thirty-page annotation36 
devoted solely to one aspect of the Sunday laws, that of discrimina-
tion between types of stores. 
Perhaps one's first reaction to such statutes could best be sum-
marized in the question, "How silly can we get?" This is hardly 
sufficient justification, however, to object to such a law as a viola-
tion of the Rule of Law in the legislative process. The reason such 
laws are passed is significant in arriving at the value judgment. 
They are passed because the people who believe, in this case in 
keeping the Sabbath holy, are afraid that their religious ideas will 
not be or have not been accepted by the community at large. 
Having failed in moral suasion, they look for legal help from the 
legislature or the city council. Such laws, therefore, are indications 
that the hold of the Church on the minds of men has been lost. 
This type of religious discrimination and legal enforcement of one 
group's moral precepts leads to the kinds of abuses which have been 
seen in some countries where the Catholic Church is the only 
recognized religious institution, or as in Sweden where recently a 
bishop of the official state church, the Lutheran, was cited for 
85 Id., April 26, 1960, p. 30, col. 4. Maryland also forbids atheists to hold public 
office, id., July 13, 1960, p. 30, col. I. 
86 Annot. 57 A.L.R. 2d 975 (1958). 
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violation of the Swedish law because he attempted to keep the 
Salvation Army from operating in one of the areas of Sweden.37 
As his is the church officially recognized by the state, his action was 
official action of the state. Likewise, at the present time in Sweden 
there is a most serious argument within the Lutheran Church (and 
therefore the state) as to whether women should be permitted to 
act as members of the clergy.38 
A perusal of the newspapers reveals another form of this at-
tempt to dictate moral standards and religious beliefs which should 
be precluded by the doctrine of the separation of church and state. 
Jewish rabbis have protested the reading of the Bible, and probably 
particularly the New Testament, as a part of the formal exercises 
in public schools.39 The New York State report to the White 
House Conference on Youth included a recommendation that 
religious beliefs be taught in the schools as an essential ingredient 
of any attempt to teach our children to be good and moral citizens.40 
Again the Jewish rabbis dissented. 
A similar instance of this use of the force of the state to further 
religious beliefs is the concept which Professor Kauper referred to 
in his discussion and which was approved by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the Zorach case.41 Why do the churches 
want school time or released time rather than dismissed time? 
They can no longer claim that it is because the public school sys-
tem takes too much of the time of the child. This argument is met 
by a dismissed-time program. Instead, they want the state, through 
a released-time program, to use its hold over the child (unfortunate 
though it is) which it has by giving him a choice of going to reli-
gious instruction or keeping at his school work. This is a use of the 
legal system which should be protested not just by rabbis but by the 
legal profession itself. Aside from any question as to whether it is 
constitutional, our value judgment of freedom of religious belief 
and pursuit of the teachings of the group of our own choice, neces-
sitates that the imprimatur of the state should not be placed on the 
activities of any religious organization. 
These religious groups seek this type of legal support because 
of an emotional reaction which psychiatrists call "reaction forma-
tion." At least subconsciously they realize that their persuasive 
powers have not been successful in reaching a great many of the 
37N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960, p. 19, col. I. 
SB Ibid. 
30 Id., June 23, 1960, p. 60, col. I. 
-to Id., March 24, 1960, p. 29, col. 4. 
41 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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people in this country. Those who argue the most zealously for 
such enactments by legislative bodies probably include those who 
need these laws to reinforce their own shaky beliefs in the validity 
of their concepts. In other words they are seeking to dictate to 
others, as a crutch for their own beliefs that subconsciously they 
are beginning to question. By working so hard to bring all types 
of pressure to bear on the legislative bodies to enact these laws, 
they convince themselves that they believe most strongly and so 
repress the beginnings of their subconscious disbelief. To para-
phrase what Christ once said, without meaning to be sacrilegious 
or heretical, one might suggest that he would say something like 
this, "What Caesar enacted, let Caesar enforce; what God com-
mands, let only God enforce." 
The legal system should have no quarrel with any religious 
person who attempts to persuade others to abide by the rules of the 
Church and observe the Sabbath. To persuade by legislation, 
however, is not merely a petty annoyance, although the annoyance 
is not a particularly great one. To believe that he has a legal 
right to force other people to think as he does is symptomatic of a 
very dangerous disease. One should have no right to control 
legally the thoughts of others to bolster his own moral or political 
beliefs because in the light of historical perspective more is lost 
when new ideas are made dangerous and people are afraid to give 
society the benefit of their new thoughts. The law should not help 
reach a result involving moral beliefs which intellectual persuasion, 
with complete access to the minds of men, has not achieved. 
B. Regulation of Non-political Speech and Ideas 
I. Obscenity and Sex. In characterizing the subject of this 
paper the term "bowdlerize" was used in a considerably broader 
sense than is ordinarily meant by those who refer to the publication 
of expurgated editions of books. The term derives from a Dr. 
Thomas Bowdler who, in 181_8, published a "family" edition of 
Shakespeare from which he had expurgated all "indelicate" pas-
sages. The term, therefore, ordinarily is used to denote deletion of 
all references to sex, or at least too realistic or lusty mentions of it. 
It was used before, however, to indicate a broad range of efforts 
to convince ourselves that something does not exist in the mind or 
feelings of man if we can just omit any reference to it, whether it 
be sex, or different religious beliefs, political ideologies, or moral 
standards. 
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This is not the time to analyze the myriad of statutory provi-
sions attempting to prohibit the use of obscene material.42 Nor is 
it the purpose here to discuss the constitutional issue involved, al-
though it is an important one which has not been satisfactorily 
resolved. Instead, some examples of calls for censorship action as 
reported in the "good grey Times" will be cited. 
The Times recently reported the concern of the House of Lords 
about the state of the British press.43 In this country, coincident 
with the abortive Jack Paar walk-out strike, the Times carried 
several news reports of meetings and speeches by members of the 
television industry and of the press,44 each accusing the other of 
calling the kettle black as to the emphasis on sex and violence in 
the bill of fare each exhibited to its public. TV officials sancti-
moniously pointed out that they had censored Paar's British w. c. 
joke (wayside church or water closet, depending on whether one 
is in Switzerland or Britain, so the newspapers informed us), and 
newspaper spokesmen replied with that hoary defense that they 
only print the news, they don't make it. Most interesting of all is 
the fact that each felt it should defend its honor with regard to this 
delicate subject, because, for all their brashness in treating sex and 
violence, they are afraid to admit that they exploit it to line their 
coffers. They do not want to call a spade a spade; they only want 
to describe or show it and profit from it. 
Much more important for present purposes is the report that a 
Harvard University psychiatrist was charged with violation of an 
obscenity statute because he imported some pornographic objects 
for use in one of his classes for doctors.45 The president of Harvard 
felt called on to issue a statement that Harvard stood behind the 
psychiatrist in this educational use of the material. 
At Illinois University, a state school, a professor was dismissed 
by the president apparently for expressing in a letter to the student 
newspaper the view that an argument could be made for premarital 
42 There is a considerable bibliography in legal periodicals. E.g., 20 LAw &: CoNTEMP, 
PROB. 531-688 (Autumn 1955); Paul &: Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on 
Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 214 (1957): Schmidt, A Justifi-
cation of Statutes Barring Pornography From the Mail, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 70 (1957); 
Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Oscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. R.Ev. 40 (1938); REPORT, 
N.Y. STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE STUDYING THE PUBLICATION AND DISSEMINATION 
OF OBJECTIONABLE AND OBSCENE MATERIALS, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 32 (1956); 33 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 
989 (1958). 
43 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1960, p. 19, col. 3. 
44 E.g., Speech of Dr. Frank Stanton to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
excerpted in the N.Y. Times, April 23, 1960, p. IO, col. 4; Gould, Tempest in a TV Tube, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1960, p. 25, col. 5. 
45 N.Y. Times, April 6, 1960, p. 41, col. 6; see id., March 28, 1960, p. 46, col. 6. 
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intercourse under some circumstances.46 According to the news-
paper accounts, nothing of this nature was advocated by the pro-
fessor in the classroom. 
In Louisiana, the legislature considered a new statute dealing 
with obscenity, and although it had not yet been considered by the 
Senate (where all such bills have died in recent years), the news 
report concluded with the statement that "so far, the bills have 
aroused relatively little opposition."47 Apparently it was the 
typical broad type of bill, and yet no bar group took up the cudgel 
in opposition, if the newspaper report is accurate. 
In New York State, the legislature considered a bill authorizing 
the Motion Picture Division of the Board of Regents to place an 
official seal of approval upon those motion pictures considered 
suitable for children.48 Not to be outdone by state officials, a 
House subcommittee in the Congress conducted extended hearings 
on sexy films and advertising.49 In addition the postal authorities 
conducted a benighted campaign to warn all parents of the harm 
possibly lurking in the mails if they did not watch out. A woman 
staff member travelled throughout the country setting up meetings 
of school officials and parents and undoubtedly giving them a thrill 
by describing just how bad the material was. Many non-govern-
mental religious and decency groups also have been organized to 
combat obscenity, but our concern is with governmental action. 
The drive for more rigid governmental prohibition of such 
obscene material has become intense enough to draw the attention 
of the American Civil Liberties Union. One of their group has 
taken the position that the test of obscenity should be that the 
publication is not censorable if it has "even the slightest redeeming 
social importance."50 It is easy to agree with this basic assumption 
(contrary to the language in Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion in the Roth51 case) that speech is speech and that it is all pro-
tected within whatever standard is applied under the first or 
fourteenth amendment. What is obscene, and therefore not pro-
tected by freedom of speech and press under Mr. Justice Brennan's 
definition, cannot be determined until the test of protected speech 
is applied. In any event, even the ACLU admits too much censor-
ship power. 
46 Id., April 8, 1960, p. 34, col. 4. 
47 Id., June 12, 1960, p. 66, col. 6. 
48 Id., March 24, 1960, p. 31, col. I. 
49 Id., Feb. 6, 1960, p. 11, col. 2. 
50 Id., April 24, 1960, p. 72, col. 1, quoting from the Roth case. 
51 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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Existing scientific investigation of the effect of pornographic 
literature has uncovered no acceptable evidence of a causal connec-
tion between such literature and illegal action, on the part even of 
the youthful.52 Although not enough evidence exists yet to be 
sure there is no causal connection, all but one or two psychiatrists 
who have expressed opinions on the matter have indicated they 
think there is no such relationship. The burden of proof in speech 
cases should remain on the prosecution to show that there is at 
least some evidence indicating a danger of action resulting from the 
exposure to the offensive material. No good reason exists justify-
ing abandonment of the clear-and-present danger test, at least as a 
matter of legislative policy judgment, and preferably as a constitu-
tional test as well. This is not the place to recount the material 
suggesting the complete lack of connection, but one interesting 
fact found by some researchers is that juvenile delinquents do not 
read very muchl53 There is much evidence that their troubles, 
if they be sexual along with others, are much more deep-seated than 
can be explained by reading violent or dirty comic books. Society 
should not fool itself into thinking it can in any way help remedy 
the situation by passing obscenity laws. 
Here again our legislatures, for fear of the political repercus-
sions if they are accused of supporting obscenity by not supporting 
the legislation banning it, have been stampeded into accepting the 
offerings of the zealots who push so hard for its passage. Those 
who become so emotionally involved in the suppression of such 
material are not very mature psychologically or they would not get 
such reactions. Probably here again is an example of a "reaction 
formation." 
2. General Customs and Culture. Space does not permit as 
full exposition of some of the other types of statutes equally repre-
hensible when tested against the value judgments which should be 
used in the legislative process of enacting statutes. It is important, 
however, to include at least a brief mention of several of these, be-
cause they show a pattern which lawyers should come to recognize 
and oppose. 
The complaint of the British Lord about the quality and char-
acter of the English press included things other than sex and ob-
52 Lockhart &: McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 
MINN. L. REv. 295, 385 (1954); A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 6, at 24 
(1957); EBERHARD &: K!tONHAUSEN, PqRNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959). 
53 Roman, Margolin, &: Harari, Reading Retardation and Delinquency 1 J. NAT. 
PAROLE AND PROBATION Ass'N 1, 1-7 (1955). 
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scenity. It referred to a general lowering of the cultural level of 
the country. Reference can be made in our own country to the 
New York Times series of articles or pieces by prominent people 
concerning "what's wrong" as well as "what's right" with America 
to find concern for our own moral standards.54 Public exchange 
of correspondence between Steinbeck and Stevenson55 points to 
the same kind of concern about the loss of moral fiber and national 
purpose. What can happen if this kind of feeling gets reflected in 
legislative enactments? 
If the propriety of legislating taste is accepted, why not adopt 
the British approach of placing an arbitrary limit on the showing of 
United States films on TV (a government operation) to a total of 
30% of the available time?56 The objection they give is that the 
life depicted in our movies is most deleterious to the British cul-
ture. The Premier of Indonesia went even further by legally 
banning "cha cha" type dancing in his country.57 In the United 
States this kind of reaction is manifested by the violent outbursts 
of parents against TV, and most parents must admit guilt to this 
occasionally. In a recent conference, the head of a parents organi-
zation warned the TV industry that if they did not do something 
about cleaning up their programs, parents would turn the sets off 
and leave them off!58 
As a result of these complaints, the Federal Communications 
Commission considered setting up a twenty-five man board to 
scrutinize the program offered by TV throughout the country.50 
A simple solution seems not to have occurred to the parents and 
to others who object not only to TV but to the type of litera-
ture found in the book stores and the reading offered in the news-
papers. Why not just refuse to buy or look at it or read it? They 
54 MacLeish, supra note 1, was one of a series of articles. 
65 Steinbeck & Stevenson, Our Rigged Morality, Coronet, March, 1960, pp. 144-47. 
66 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1960, p. 31, col. 4. 
67 Id., Feb. 7, 1960, p. 13, col. l; and see the list of Do's and Don't's published by the 
Hungarian government, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1960, p. 3, col. 4. The list included advice 
such as: 
- "Never rest your elbow on a person's shoulder or hat." 
- "Don't write in an offensive tone to anybody; you can never be sure that the letter 
will be read only by the addressee." 
- "A spoon is to be used for soup and liquids." 
- "After having spent an evening with a friend, don't abandon him immediately." 
- "Use a napkin to wipe your mouth." 
- "When you speak, it is not polite to play with the button on the other fellow's suit." 
58 N.Y. Times, March 30, 1960, p. 24, col. l; id., June 27, 1960, p. 25, col. 4, reporting 
an attack by religious leaders on TV exploitation of sex. 
59 Id., May 21, 1960, p. 1, col. 2. 
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could turn the set off themselves instead of waiting for "Big 
Brother" to do it. They also could refuse to patronize those spon-
soring such objectionable cultural material. 
Imagine the kind of mind possessed by a person who could be 
hired to sit on a review board looking at television hour after hour, 
day after day, and week after week! To think of the possibility of 
this kind of person having the power to determine what type of 
material one should see, or refuse to see, as the case may be, reminds 
one of the comment Groucho Marx once made when he was in-
vited to join a very exclusive club. He replied that he refused to 
join an organization which let a person like himself become a 
member. 
3. Honesty. One need only look at the newspapers in this six 
months to note an apparently entirely different type of moral 
indignation which may lead to government action. The New 
York Times alone in the past six months has carried at least fifty 
items dealing with the functions of the Federal Communications 
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission as they relate to 
honesty in public programs and advertising. There was a much 
greater public hue and cry about the rigged quiz shows and 
similar entertainment contests than about false advertising about 
cigarette filters, or the advertising of drugs to doctors and the 
writing of articles which were really paid advertisements. One TV 
network even issued orders that canned laughter used by TV 
comedians would have to be announced as such.6° Congressional 
committees concerned themselves with payola and plugola, and 
have started to investigate the validity of the statistical rating serv-
ices used by the networks to determine the popularity of pro-
grams. 61 One report indicated that 18 Senate and 100 House Bills 
dealing with these problems had been introduced at the 1960 con-
gressional session alone.62 
To the extent that these matters deal with entertainment and 
commodities related to entertainment, such as records, such con-
cern at best is "much ado about nothing," and puts the government 
needlessly in the censorship business. Nevertheless, none other 
than the drafters of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code 
have accepted the theory of government intervention in rigged 
oo Gould, Canned TV Laughter, id. March 16, 1960, p. 75, col. I; see also N.Y. Times, 
March 24, 1960, p. 29, col. 7. 
61 Id., March 30, 1960, p. 43, col. 2. 
62 Id., June 1, 1960, p. 63, col. 3. 
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entertainment. Section 223.9 of the Mode Penal Code makes it a 
crime to rig "any publicly exhibited contest."63 
Here is another example of attempts to get the legislature and 
the legal system engaged in what one layman described as "nosey-
parkerism. "64 Enforcement of such statutes is very expensive and 
probably not at all effective, no matter how much effort is ex-
pended. More important, such statutes foster an unhealthy, un-
critical trust that the government will protect us against our 
gullibility rather than teach us to be independently critical in our 
judgments. More than likely the demand for such legislation is 
caused again by a "reaction formation" much like that found in 
those who promote laws which enforce certain religious and moral 
beliefs. 
4. Group Defamation and Group Pressure on Government 
Agencies. Here again the justifiable concern of a responsible sec-
tion of the community results in the imposition of artifical if not 
even dangerous limitations on freedom of speech. Admittedly 
these persons seek to right what most agree are wrong ideas, but 
legal pressures of the kind insisted on should not be permitted. In 
Queen's College in New York City recently, twenty-two faculty 
members felt obliged to object to the recommendation of the City 
Commission on Intergroup Relations to the effect that the presi-
dent of the city colleges take disciplinary action against a student 
newspaper which the Commission felt published anti-religious 
statements.65 The student editors had published an article on 
non-Catholic views about birth control and were criticized by the 
City Commission on Intergroup Relations, although the editors 
sought to run an article on the Catholic view at the same time. The 
same thing is found in the criticisms by the Jewish people of the 
failure of the Bavarian government to prevent the singing of Nazi 
songs by members attending an old SS reunion. 66 
Worst of all is the kind of action taken by the United States 
Supreme Court in the famous or infamous Beauharnais case.07 
Here the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute as applied to 
the White Circle League members who handed out pamphlets 
asking the electorate to encourage the legislature to pass statutes 
providing for segregation in housing. The pamphlet described 
03 A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 11, § 223.9 (1960). 
64 READ, MACDONALD & FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 761 (1959). 
05 N.Y. Times, April 9, 1960, p. 2, col. 4. 
66 Id., June 12, 1960, p. 85, col. 4. 
67 Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 259 (1952). 
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the Negro race in terms which, if applied to individuals, clearly 
would be defamatory. 
The assertion here is that all of these attempts are misguided 
ones, resulting from a legitimate emotional reaction to past wrongs 
which cannot be corrected by limitations on freedom of speech. 
The same protection of free speech which allows one to argue for 
desegregation or to protest against racial or religious bigotry, or 
for or against birth control, should apply to those who espouse 
the view with which one disagrees, no matter how abhorrent he 
finds it, so long as it constitutes no substantial and imminent danger 
of illegal action. The emotional desires of the minority and ma-
ligned groups are understandable, but Ia-wyers should not accept 
the legislative value judgment which permits this infringement of 
the rights of the people to advocate unpopular views. Members of 
the bar, here as well as in the cases mentioned before, should ac-
tively oppose enactment of any such statutes. This does not mean 
that the seriousness of the problem of religious bigotry should be 
dismissed lightly because in Washington, D. C., in one six-weeks 
period, eighty-two acts of desecration of religious building oc-
curred. 08 Nevertheless, these problems cannot be met by prevent-
ing freedom of speech, except when clear and present danger of 
action is found. 
C. Regulation of Political Speech and Ideas 
Another type of statute fits the same basic pattern which vio-
lates the legislative rule of law here advocated. Statutes of this type 
attempt to regulate unpopular political beliefs. Space does not 
permit development of the details, but a few examples should be 
given. One is the refusal of Mayor Wagner of New York City to 
permit the American Nazi party to hold a meeting in Union Square 
on July 4. 00 The reason he gave was that the views are so unpopular 
in New York that a riot might ensue, such as that suggested by the 
150 people who gathered when the leader came to apply for his 
license. This is like the government action involved in the 
Terminiello70 case, and equally wrong from the standpoint of the 
value judgments we should insist on as part of our legislative rule 
of law. 
The fact that unpopular political views may cause some people 
to riot is not, without more, a justification for preventing such 
OBN.Y. Times, Feb. I, 1960, p. 9, col. 4. 
oo Id., June 23, 1960, p. I, col. I. 
70 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949). 
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speech or for arresting the speaker. Only if responsible govern-
ment authorities have taken reasonable but unsuccessful precau-
tions to prevent the riot should a person be prevented from ex-
pressing views calling for no illegal action. There was no charge 
in either situation that the speaker was trying to arouse riotous 
feelings in his audience. The riot was by those who disagreed with 
the views. 
The actions of private groups such as the American Legion 
who succeed in holding the movie industry and some public school 
boards in fear71 do not fall within the scope of the condemnation 
here asserted. They are unfortunate according to the views of 
many people, but this involves no legislative rule of law judgment. 
One should object strenuously, however, to the modern ver-
sions of the old Sedition Acts of 1798. The idea of the Post Office 
Department censoring mail from the Communist countries by 
refusing to let Americans receive it is a most pathological re-
action. 72 The same pathological reaction is evident in the attempts 
by our government in the past to control or prevent the visits of 
Americans, particularly newsmen, to Red China, at least to the 
extent that such refusals are based on a fear of our people finding 
out what goes on in Red China.73 If there ever was an institutional 
"reaction formation" case, this is a perfect example. 
One last example of misguided statutes can be cited: statutes 
that deal with oaths. Statutory attempts to make those attending 
schools take oaths that they do not believe in forceful overthrow 
of the government, or belong to organizations which are known 
to have advocated such beliefs at some time, are most misguided 
efforts. In New York even high school students must take such an 
oath to graduate, although it was recently waived, pending re-
definition of the policy.74 A national law imposes both an oath 
and an affidavit requirement upon those who receive federal schol-
arships to attend college. The recent action of the United States 
Senate to end the student oath moves in the right direction, but not 
far enough.75 Psychologically it is ·wrong to leave in the provision 
about being a member of the Communist Party. If there is one 
group whose exposure to the educational process should be con-
tinued, it is this very one. What better assurance is there of a 
71 N.Y. Times, May 12, 1960, p. 42, col. 6; id., Feb. 15, 1960, p. 21, col. l; Crowther, 
Hitting the Blacklist, id., Feb. 14, 1960, § 2, Part I, p. IX, col. 7; id., Feb. 9, 1960, p. 28, 
col. l; id., Feb. 8, 1960, p. 1, col. 4; id., May 24, 1960, p. 43, col. 3. 
72 ld., May 23, 1960, p. 1, col. 2. 
73 Id., July 1, 1960, p. 8, col. 2. 
74 ld., June 23, 1960, p. 8, col. 3. 
75 Id., June 16, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; id., June 6, 1960, p. 22, col. 7. 
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chance to convince them of the error of the communistic beliefs 
than to subject them to the kind of intellectual questioning received 
from their peers and their teachers in a university in this country? 
Aside from the possible pathological explanation for much of 
the support for such government action, it seems to be a most use-
less form of activity. The proper reaction to such oaths, as legal 
requirements, is epitomized by a story that appeared in the New 
York Times.76 An eight-year-old boy was being tried as a delin-
quent before the magistrate in London. In putting the boy under 
oath, the magistrate decided he should determine whether or not 
the eight-year-old understood the significance of this ritual. The 
reply of the boy is a classic. When asked if he understood what it 
meant to place his hand on the Bible and swear to tell the truth, he 
replied: "Yes. That means that when you don't tell the truth, 
everybody must still believe you." The loyalty oath does nothing 
but insult and antagonize those who are loyal, because their loyalty 
is questioned, and means nothing to those the oaths seek to control. 
Such people have no compunctions about lying. La·wyers are badly 
misled if they think that taking a formal oath means anything to 
a person, other than those who, on being seriously enjoined to tell 
the truth, would tell the truth anY'vay. 
VI. REACTION FORMATION AND THOUGHT CONTROL 
The statutes discussed above have one common denominator -
basically they are "thought control" measures frequently enacted 
by the legislature as a result of the pathological reaction formations 
of zealots. Although the emotional reactions people have to the 
matters dealt with in such statutes are neither abnormal nor un-
usual, the legal negative injunctions enacted as a result of such 
irrational reactions almost never help solve the basic problem. 
Frequently they intensify it and usually prevent identification of 
more imaginative and sounder solutions. 
Anthony Comstock and his successful campaign to enact the 
first federal statute regulating the mailing of obscene material is 
a classic example of reaction formation at work. Apparently he 
was abnormally interested in women's bosoms and unconsciously 
sought to repress his fear of this interest by crusading against ob-
scenity.77 The unsuccessful struggle of many courts with the inter-
70 Id., March 23, 1960, p. 59, col. 2. 
77Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214, 216 (1957). Com-
stock's diary is very revealing of the man who caused all this trouble. His reaction to the 
news that it was so cold at Buchanan's inaugural festivities that the ladies all had to wear 
shawls or cloaks over their low-cut ball gowns is a violently emotional outburst of righteous 
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pretation of the statute which Comstock got enacted has consumed 
considerable valuable time and no proof exists that any immoral 
thoughts have been prevented or erased by such efforts. 
A recent call in England for caning of those who commit vio-
lent crimes78 and most of the resistance in this country to abolish-
ment of capital punishment for certain crimes also are the result 
of reaction formation. Subconsciously such people fear they might 
lose control and commit such acts themselves, and fortify their 
defense against this admission by overreacting against the one who 
is caught. The same often is true of the crusader against prostitu-
tion, of some members of vice squads who seek to arrest homosex-
uals, and of the person who feels "called" to serve on censorship 
boards. Psychiatrists in treating patients from these groups fre-
quently find them emotionally immature or neurotically disturbed 
about these very subject matters. Often they use prostitutes them-
selves, or are incipient homosexuals who psychologically "entrap" 
those they arrest, or get a "thrill" from the obscene material they 
review in the name of protecting the rest of the public; all varia-
tions on the old adage, "It takes one to catch one." To take only 
one example, considering the amount of pornographic or near-
pornographic material submitted to censorship boards for perusal, 
clearly practically all of a member's time, spare and otherwise, is 
spent reading such material. According to their own assertions, at 
best they cannot but become warped personalities after service on 
such boards! The interest of people in these subjects cannot be 
legislated out of existence by a mere negative injunction; the cause 
must be found and treated, if possible. 
The proposals of parent groups and congressional committees 
to regulate the television industry to assure the exposure of the 
young and even adults to proper moral values only, and the con-
sideration of enacting legal sanctions against the rigging of contests 
(athletic or intellectual) and popularity ratings of records and TV 
programs79 generally are manifestations of the same irrational re-
action formation and equally misguided. Without suggesting ap-
proval of the rigging of contests or ratings, the anger or at least 
indignation with which people react to revelation of these matters 
thanksgiving that none could show their practically exposed bosoms. A psychiatrist has 
little difficulty identifying this as a reaction formation. 
78 N.Y. Times, March 19, 1960, p. 3, col. I. The Tories in England passed a resolution 
urging caning against the entreaties of some of their leaders to wait until a study then 
in progress was completed. 
79 Notes 61-63 supra. 
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suggests that their egos are hurt because they have been betrayed 
as gullible persons with little independent judgment. 
There is some expert opinion to the effect that the basic values 
of the child are formed before he reaches an age when TV is mean-
ingful to him.80 Surely there is little to distinguish the deceit 
practiced in TV wrestling from that involved in giving answers to 
university professors before they appear on TV quiz shows, except 
that the academic community is hurt much more by the latter 
because it harbored the misguided hope that the interest of the 
public in intellectual achievements on TV meant that the country 
now thought university professors are people to be respected and 
admired, to be idolized even. These emotional reactions are not a 
rational basis for seeking the enactment of a legislative solution 
with all of the paraphernalia of government, merely to assure honest 
entertainment and to conceal the fact that Barnum of circus fame 
was right! 
Some may react with nausea or at least disgust to the insertion 
of sexual overtones into political campaigns,81 but is not this merely 
the result of anger aroused because a highly intellectualized version 
of how a presidential candidate should be appraised is shown to 
be the unrealistic view of practical politics it is? Candidates are 
voted for by some because of just such unconscious appeal, but 
such reactions and their influence on elections certainly cannot be 
prevented by the enactment of a law prohibiting any political ad-
vertisements which "appeal to prurient interests," to borrow the 
test from the Roth case majority opinion.82 
Those who seek to censor political beliefs with modern versions 
of the Sedition Acts probably are experiencing reaction formation 
also, and legitimately may be suspected of subconsciously being 
much less loyal to our ideals than they profess. The pathological 
gyrations of the McCarthys and the Kaspers gave every indication 
SON,Y. Times, March llO 1960, p. 24, col. I. 
81 The writer had just such a reaction to an advertisement with political overtones in 
the New York Times. It was a full-page picture of a closeup of Senator John Kennedy. 
Very likely it aroused the maternal instincts of a good many adult women in the United 
States, what with his infectious grin, rumpled hair and glasses pushed up on top of his 
head, The caption in large, black type was: "Will Women Love Him or Leave Him?" In 
smaller print the advertisement goes on: "One commentator says, 'The effect he has on 
women is almost naughty.' And in March Ladies' Home Journal, Jack [not John you'll 
notice] Kennedy himself says, 'I depend on the women in a campaign.'" It turned out to be 
a magazine's advertisement plugging its March issue, but the writer's first reaction was 
of nausea. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1960, p. 32, col. 2. 
82 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Instead of legislating away such 
emotional reactions our society must pin its hopes on signs of self-motivated maturity 
such as that which perhaps is indicated by the report of the growth of the New York 
Times, both in advertising and in circulation, in New York City at a rate greater than any 
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to the trained psychiatrist that these super-patriots were fighting 
some serious emotional problems.83 Those who decry dictatorship 
so vigorously remind one of that wonderful cartoon showing 
Khrushchev with foot on the rail and elbow on the bar declaring, 
"I can lick anyone in this room who says that I'm not the most 
peace-loving man here!" Those who have real faith in a free de-
mocracy are willing to let others be exposed to opposing thoughts. 
In any event, Communism and Red China cannot be bowdlerized. 
Threats do not disappear merely because one refuses to listen or 
see. Fears are conquered only when faced realistically, so those who 
know most about human psychology tell us. Probably the very 
people who want to regulate and suppress these matters which 
expose our people to the propaganda of the dictator are themselves 
psychologically dictator personalities. 
VII. THE DANGERS OF TASTE STATUTES 
Admittedly, society faces some serious problems in some of the 
areas here discussed. Nevertheless, attempts to solve the problems 
by statutes of the kind under consideration do little or no good 
and are harmful for several reasons. They often breed contempt 
for the law generally, because they impose standards which are 
known to be substantially unenforceable. Such laws waste the time 
of enforcement officers and breed dissatisfaction with the law, 
among both officers and those arrested, because it is known that 
the number of persons who have done the same thing without 
detection probably far exceeds the number arrested. Equality in 
law enforcement, although never capable of full achievement, is 
by these statutes rendered obviously and ridiculously unattainable. 
More importantly, these statutes impinge most seriously on our 
concept of the maximum freedom of belief and speech for the in-
dividual. The ideas being huckstered by the zealot (including 
the anti-zealot zealot!) always should be viewed with skepticism, 
particularly when they tend to restrict the political processes by 
other daily. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 12, col. 6. The public may be less gullible than 
it used to be and as it becomes more sophisticated perhaps it will seek to be culture vultures 
instead of materialistic status symbol seekers. In any event laws will not effect a change 
which will prevent the kind of gullibility indicated by the report that one Washington, 
D.C., liquor store finally labeled one of its whiskeys "Brand X" to meet the requests of its 
many customers who said, "I've been hearing a lot about Brand X on TV. I'd like to try 
some." N.Y. Times, May 3, 1960, p. 66, col. 7. 
83 Marmor, Bernard &: Ottenberg, Psychodynamics of Group Opposition to Health 
Programs, 30 AM. J. 0RTHOPSYCHIATRY, No. 2, p. 341 (April 1960). They report that 
John Kasper of Clinton, Tennessee race riot fame has since led campaigns against fluorida-
tion and the Alaska Mental Health bill. 
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which legislative change is achieved.84 Taste legislation paints the 
wrong picture for those nations in Asia and Africa which, we hope, 
will look to us for guidance in creating a free society dedicated to 
the dignity of man. The American Dream described by Mr. Mac-
Leish can be realized only by exercising and enlarging our intel-
lectual freedom. Is it rational to be so concerned and frightened 
by what another reads or feels or thinks, so long as he takes no 
action which physically affects the adult members of society without 
their consent? We must learn to show more faith in our ideals 
than is exhibited by such laws. 
Finally, the time spent by legislatures in pursuing these fruit-
less tasks serves only to deter them from experimenting with more 
imaginative and affirmative solutions for our social problems. The 
twenty-two major bills pending in the 1960 session of Congress85 
deserved the full time of our representatives without dilution by 
18 Senate and 100 House bills on advertising and TV alone.86 Simi-
lar examples are found in the various state legislatures.87 The leg-
islative process must be used imaginatively and with as much real-
ism and rationality as possible, which means the punitive and 
negative injunctions must be minimized. The youth delinquency 
problem will not be solved by making more of their actions crim-
inal violations, yet legislative time is spent in this direction. The 
pioneering approach to the narcotics problem which England has 
84 See suggestion in another context by Justice Stone, United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
85 N.Y. Times, March 28, 1960, p. 14, col. 3; see also id., June 29, 1960, p. 18, col. 3. 
so Note 62 supra. 
87 The legislatures of the various states in the 1959 sessions officially ordered that the 
following studies be made, as reported in the Legislative Research Checklist, published by 
the Council of State Governments, February and May 1960: confinement of wild animals 
as tourist attractions (N.C.); use of retired persons to run wild animals in their natural 
habitat (Wis.); the practice of barbering (Calif., $17,500); the cost of garbage collection, 
a continuation of a 1958 study (N.J.); opening of liquor establishments for sale of liquor 
on Sunday (Wash.); the trading stamp industry (Mich., $1500 for House and $500 for 
Senate study); same subject (Calif., $25,000); continuation of 1949 study of publication 
and distribution of offensive and obscene material (N.Y., $20,000); pornographic literature 
(Calif.); feasibility of conducting a space age exposition (Calif., $17,500); bill relating to 
carnivals and circuses at fairs (Calif., $17,500); bill relative to kosher meats (Calif., $19,000); 
bills relative to labeling vitamins and to kosher meats (Calif., $20,000); preservation of 
antiquities (Md.); preservation of historic sites (N.Y., $15,000); automobile license plates 
(Calif., $40,000); subliminal messages (Calif., $17,500); biils authorizing night harness 
racing and prohibiting minors at horse races (Calif., $14,500); bills relative to pay television 
(Calif., $15,000). 
A look at a list of reports of studies actually completed does indicate that some of 
the less important studies do not create waste paper in the form of a report. Many of 
the studies listed here undoubtedly are worthy causes but are they worthy of serious 
legislative attention? The relative monetary support given to various subjects of study 
seems disproportionate at least. More important, most studies by legislative committees 
make little contribution to the fundamental knowledge which will be required to solve 
the problems suggested, assuming them worthy of legislative attention. 
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adopted has not been tried here in spite of the evidence that estab-
lishment of official dispensaries where addicts are sustained for 
pennies a day will remove all profit in illegal traffic. New solutions 
to gambling must be found if the largest state in the Union finds 
that this is by far its most pressing law enforcement concern.88 
The problems of the poor, the chronically unemployed, the skid 
row bums,-B0 and the mothers of illegitimate children90 challenge 
our best efforts, all of our legislative time, and our most imaginative 
minds. 
Conclusion 
I suggest that the Rule of Law, as applied to the legislative 
process, requires that legislatures confine themselves to controlling 
human actions, and desist from efforts to control taste in moral and 
political beliefs, or other matters which fall in the realm of intellec-
tual ideas. The attacks on some results of the legislative process 
and criticism of those legislators who have heeded too willingly or 
fearfully the incantations of the taste zealots is not predicated upon 
any lack of respect for the legislative process. Rather, the criticism 
is offered in the firm belief that the legislature is the ultimate de-
terminer and therefore also the protector of our way of life, and 
with the hope that its efforts can be directed toward the attainment 
of the basic values of our society. If the stupid, the humorous, or 
the ludicrous_ has sometimes been emphasized, it has been done 
for a most serious purpose - to help the legal profession recognize 
its obligation to protect the basic human values we cherish and to 
recognize the ways in which they may be subtly undermined or 
attacked. If this discussion does no more than stimulate thought 
about these matters, it has served a substantial part of its purpose. 
If it should convert readers to the point of view propounded, so 
much the better. 
88 N.Y. Times, April I, 1960, p. 27, col. 2. 
89 Id., March 14, 1960, p. 1, col. 6. 
90 Just one example of misguided legislation in the area of action (basically the sub• 
ject of another discussion) will demonstrate how ridiculous we become when we emphasize 
the negative instead of developing new affirmative legislative programs to solve social 
welfare problems. The problem of the poor taking advantage of the aid to dependent 
(usually illegitimate) children program by not getting married is a most serious one in 
both North and South but how can it possibly be solved by the bill reported in the fol-
lowing news item? "Baton Rouge, Louisiana, June 14 (AP). The Louisiana Senate passed 
a bill today to make it a crime to have more than one illegitimate child." N.Y. Times, 
June 16, 1960, p. 37, col. I. Apparently the statutory prohibition applies only to women, 
but even so one doubts seriously that society intends to solve the problem of support of 
illegitimate children by jailing all potential mothers until it is biologically safe to return 
them to society, if they have twice had children out of wedlock. For a follow-up on the 
repercussions under the federal statutes of the Louisiana legislation, see story in N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 16, 1960, p. 25, col. I. 
